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Many scholarly journals charge high prices to research libraries and generate high
profits. Open access regulation, in its various forms, can mitigate this problem.
This essay examines a particular policy, “Plan S”, which aims broadly to require
regulated authors to publish their research in open access journals, which among
other drawbacks of the policy greatly limits their publishing options.
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1 Introduction
In this essay I discuss the scholarly journal market, including forms of market failure the
market might suffer in the absence of regulation. The market failure most prominent
in current debates involves the excessive prices that some publishers charge readers for
access to their articles, especially within science disciplines. Various kinds of open access
regulation have been proposed to mitigate this problem. One recent proposal is known
enigmatically as “Plan S”, the many and changing details of which will be explained later,
and in this essay I discuss the pros and cons of this plan alongside other potential regulatory
policies. I will use an economist’s perspective, both in terms of using economic tools to
discuss this particular market and in terms of a focus on how Plan S would be likely to
impact the economics discipline.
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A useful perspective on the scholarly journal market is that it is a “two-sided” market,
providing value to readers (who gain access to articles they wish to read) and to authors
(who gain exposure for their work to readers).1 Journals incur costs when providing their
services, and these costs are usually met from charges levied on one or both sides of the
market. For this essay, the two principal purposes of a journal are (i) to disseminate an
author’s work to potential readers and (ii) to certify various attributes of that work.
In more detail, purpose (i) involves the journal making available its content to those
readers–and only those readers–permitted to consume its content. With the advent of
online journal access, the costs associated with dissemination to subscribers have fallen
drastically in recent years. Authors care (some more than others) about the size of their
journal’s readership, but plausibly care mostly that their scientific peers have access to
their work (either in its final journal form or as a working paper if available) rather than
the wider public. Nevertheless, there can be much value in the wider population gaining
access to up-to-date scholarly material, at the time of writing perhaps most notably in the
area of health.
Purpose (ii) is to certify that the article’s content is novel, correct, concerns certain
specialist topics, and it may also signal how important and/or interesting the article is.
Certification is valuable for both sides of the market, although for different reasons. For
readers, (ii) helps them to discover the content they will likely want to consult, from out
of the vast pool of available content.2 Given that reading a paper involves a sunk cost, a
reader benefits from ex ante information about a paper’s quality and topic before deciding
whether or not to read it. For an author, on the other hand, (ii) provides a useful signal
of the quality of her work, including to people who may not actually want or be able to
read it. The quality of an author’s publications collected in her CV, as judged by various
committees, determine the hiring, promotion, and research funding decisions which are
so crucial for her career. This certification function is particularly important for more
junior researchers, who have not yet built up a widely perceived reputation. Many junior
researchers would be willing to pay much money out of their own pocket to place a paper
1Early contributions to the theory of two-sided markets include Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet
and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006). See Rysman (2009) for an early overview of two-sided markets.
2The economics subject repository RePEc currently hosts around three million research items, including
articles from around 3,500 journals.
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in a prestigious journal.3 The costs associated with certification (e.g., paying the journal’s
editors and, sometimes, its referees) have not fallen nearly as much over recent years as
those of dissemination. Moreover, as the internet makes various kinds of self-dissemination
by authors so easy and discoverable, purpose (ii) is nowadays arguably the more important
of these two roles.
As mentioned, a journal usually covers its costs by charging one or both sides of the
market.4 An open access journal makes all of its content free to readers at the time of pub-
lication. Such journals usually cover their costs by charging authors or their institutions to
publish their work. Thus, anyone can read the 2020 article “Open access publishers: the
new players” in PLOS ONE for free, but its authors have paid around $1749 (at current
prices) to publish there. Within my own economics discipline, only a few well-known jour-
nals currently are open access. (Perhaps the three best-known economics journals which
are open access are the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Quantitative Economics and
Theoretical Economics.) In particular, none of the so-called “top 5” economics journals–
American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, and Review of Economic Studies–are currently open access. For better
or worse, the ability to publish articles in top 5 journals is an important route to career
success for academic economists.5 Some journals do not supply credible certification at
all, and publish almost anything in return for a fee from the author. These journals often
position themselves as “open access”, although they have minimal readership and could
not generate much subscription revenue if they tried. Part of the author demand for these
“predatory” journals is to fool those evaluation committees that are ignorant about which
journals are discriminating about the articles they publish and which are not.6
At the other extreme, a subscription-only (or “closed”) journal sells all its content
to readers (usually libraries in universities and other research institutions). Subscription
journals often allow authors to publish their work without charge, so that authors have
3Attema et al. (2014) provide more graphic evidence of the extent to which an author would go to
place an article in a top journal.
4A number of journals currently have neither reader nor author fees (sometimes this is referred to as
diamond or platinum open access). Presumably, these journals operate with funding from institutions or
charities, and/or by editors and reviewers donating their time.
5See Heckman and Moktan (2020) for extensive discussion on this point.
6See Bagues et al. (2019) for evidence of this effect.
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free access to the journal’s subscribers. A few and declining number of economics journals
follow this funding model, and do not allow their authors to pay for open access to their
articles. So far as I understand, for instance, it is not currently possible for an author to
make her article open access in the American Economic Review, although the author is
permitted immediately to post the published article on her personal website.
However, a great many journals obtain revenue from both sides of the market. Histori-
cally, since costs (especially for dissemination) used to be far higher, journals had difficulties
covering their costs, and many of them levied fees both for subscribing and for publishing.
However, in recent years a more subtle form of two-sided pricing has emerged, whereby
a so-call hybrid journal offers access to some of its content only to subscribers, but offers
authors an option to pay to make their article immediately open access to all readers. Ap-
parently the first hybrid journal was the Florida Entomologist, which adopted this funding
model in 1998. (See Walker, 1998, for an account of this innovation, and an insightful
early discussion of open access issues in general.) For instance, Managerial and Decision
Economics currently offers online institutional subscription in the US in 2021 for $3,561,
and authors can make their individual article free to all readers by paying $2,500. Unless
they face strong regulatory encouragement, however, relatively few authors will choose to
spend their own money, or money from their limited research budgets, on making their
work open access in their chosen journal. For instance, in 2018 just 6 out of the 132 articles
published that year in the Economic Journal were open access. A variant of the hybrid
approach are the so-called “read and publish” deals offered by publishers to institutions.
When a university strikes such a deal with a publisher, its students and researchers have
access to that publisher’s journals and its researchers are able to publish their articles with
open access in that publisher’s journals.7 Another variant is the so-called “mirror” journal,
where what is in effect the same journal (with the same editorial board and acceptance
standards) is split into two–for instance, Elsevier’s Water Research and Water Research
X–one of which is subscription and one of which is open access, and once her paper has
been accepted the author can decide in which of the two to publish (paying a publication
7More precisely, researchers can publish their articles with open access in a subset of that publisher’s
journals, often that publisher’s set of hybrid journals. (Open access journals are often excluded, as they
involve no subscription element for the institution.)
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fee for the open access outlet).8
A snapshot of the balance between subscription and open access content in a major
publisher’s set of journals can be found in Elsevier’s 2020 Annual Report. There, the
company states that in 2020 it published 2,650 journals, of which around 500 were open
access journals and around 1,900 were hybrid journals. It published around 560,000 articles,
of which around 81,000 (or nearly 15%) were open access. The company had revenues of
£2,692m, of which 76% came from subscriptions. Putting these figures together show that
the company obtained average revenue per subscription article equal to about £4,270.9 Its
author charges for open access vary widely across journals, from near zero to nearly £8,000
for a premier science journal such as Cell. However, the bulk of author charges lie in the
range £1,800 to £3,000.10
A final important way in which publishers differ is the extent to which they permit
authors to disseminate the accepted versions of their published papers. Some publishers
only permit an author to post the accepted version online after a lengthy embargo period,
while others allow authors immediately to post the final version online (either on their
personal webpage or in specified repositories). Interestingly, Elsevier, which is sometimes
the target of open access activists’ ire for its high subscription prices, has had since 2004 a
very liberal policy towards self-dissemination, and it allows an author to post the accepted
version on her webpage or on RePEc immediately on publication. (Oxford University
Press, by contrast, has an embargo period of 24 months for most of its economics journals
before an accepted version of a published article could be uploaded to RePEc.) In practice,
though, it is hard to prevent authors from uploading the accepted version of their paper
to a repository: an economics paper, for instance, will typically have been through several
rounds of revision before being accepted, and it would take much effort from the publisher
8Mirror journals seem to be rare in economics. An exception is the Journal of Public Economics Plus
(whose parent journal is the Journal of Public Economics). However, this journal charges a submission
rather than a publication fee, and so a submitting author must decide in advance whether to publish in
the open access version. At the time of writing this journal has published just one article.
9See pages 14 and 16 of RELX Annual Report and Financial Statements 2020.
10See the spreadsheet of author fees available from https://www.elsevier.com/about/policies/pricing. An
interesting feature is that for Elsevier’s mirror journals (all marked with an “X” as with Water Research
previously mentioned), it is cheaper for authors to publish in the open access journal than to buy open
access in the hybrid journal, perhaps reflecting the opportunity cost of foregone subscription revenue when
an author buys open access in a hybrid journal.
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to determine which precise versions have been posted online.
An important issue, and one central to the open access debate, is whether or not an
unregulated journal market will implement an appropriate balance of charges across the
two sides of the market. In particular, a frequent claim is that many publishers, left free
to do so, charge libraries too much to subscribe to their journals. In the next section I
explore why it is indeed likely that journals will levy high subscription charges rather than
high author charges. But taking this pricing pattern as given for now, it is clear that high
subscription charges have an adverse impact on both distributional and efficiency aims.
Even if libraries are just willing to pay them, high subscription charges have a welfare
cost if a dollar of library budget is worth more in welfare terms than a dollar of publisher
profit, as is plausibly the case when research libraries are ultimately financed from costly
public funds. It is inefficient to exclude interested readers and libraries when it costs next
to nothing to serve them. It may also be costly in political terms to exclude readers, if
those who pay for public research through their taxes are denied timely access to its final
product.
Related to this is the observation that scientific publishing can be highly profitable.
As the UK’s House of Commons (2004, page 5) put it, “There is mounting concern that
the financial benefits from the Government’s substantial investment in research are being
diverted to an excessive degree into the pockets of publishers’ shareholders.” In the year
2020, for instance, Elsevier made profit of £1021m on revenues of £2692m, a profit margin
of about 38%.11 It is not just the most commercially minded publishers which benefit from
subscription fees. Many learned societies devoted to their respective disciplines have their
operations funded in large part by journal subscriptions, and several universities obtain sig-
nificant revenues from their university presses. Scientific publishing is highly concentrated,
according to traditional measures. For instance, Larivière et al. (2015, page 4) document
how five publishers together supply about half the articles, half the journals, and half the
citations, and this is true both for both natural and medical sciences (combined) and for
social sciences and humanities (combined). While this degree of concentration may play
a role in driving up prices and profits in the absence of regulation, in the next section I
argue that a more fundamental source of market power is the monopoly nature of each
11See page 7 of RELX Annual Report and Financial Statements 2020.
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individual article.
Open access regulations are intended to combat high subscription charges. Varying
standards of “purity” for open access exist. When the published journal article is freely
available to all readers at the time of publication, this is usually termed “gold” open access
for that article. Plan S, discussed in more detail in section 3, originally proposed a strong
version of this, which is that an article be published in an open access journal rather than
merely made open access within a hybrid journal, i.e., alongside other articles that are also
freely available.
Stopping short of gold open access are various kinds of “near” open access. These
include publishing in a journal which has a short delay, or embargo, after publication before
the article is made freely available. For instance, PNAS makes its content freely available
six months after publication (and even this delay can be circumvented if the author pays
for immediate open access). Second, an author might post online the accepted version of
her paper (and publishes in a journal which permits this), in which case readers have free
access to a close substitute for the published article. (This is usually known as “green”
open access.) In the economics discipline, the culture is such that almost all published
articles are freely available online in working paper form, although in other disciplines it is
rarer, or even forbidden, to post working papers online prior to publication. Third, many
journals, usually non-profit journals, charge “low” but not zero subscription fees. The top
5 economics journals arguably all fall into this category.12 In the economics discipline, this
combination of a working paper culture along with relatively inexpensive journals (at least
at the top end) has meant that discussions and controversies about open access have been
muted relative to those within other subject areas.
Finally, there are various kinds of illegal open access, where published work is dissemi-
nated in violation of the publisher’s copyright requirements. As mentioned, authors might
post the accepted version of the published article online before a required embargo period,
or even post the published version online. It is hard for published to monitor and enforce
12In 2021, institutional online subscription charges in the US were $950 for the AER (which includes
subscriptions to seven other journals from the American Economic Association), $826 for Econometrica,
$552 to $1300 for the JPE (where the charge depends on the size of the institution), $680 for the QJE, and
$724 for Review of Economic Studies. (Some of these journals require submitting authors to be members
of an associated society and/or charge a modest submission fee.) These charges are significantly lower
than that for Managerial and Decision Economics, say.
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all such violations. There are also “pirate” websites, most notably Sci-Hub, which allow
readers to download published articles that the website has somehow managed to obtain.
Open access regulation requires designated authors–for instance, those whose research
was funded from a specific source–to make their research open access in a specified manner,
either in a “gold” form or in some “near open access” form. If an article is required to have
gold open access, then any publisher who wishes to publish this article is constrained to
set a subscription charge of zero for this article, which can be viewed as an extreme kind
of price cap. Note that there is always “open access” for the certification role of journals:
one need not subscribe to the American Economic Review to discover that a particular
article and author has been published there.
2 Some Economics of Open Access Regulation
To understand the impact of open access regulation, it is conceptually useful to distinguish
between the dissemination and certification functions of journals.13 For the initial discus-
sion I focus on the dissemination purpose of a journal, and subsequently add the extra
complexities which arise from their certification purpose.
Without regulatory intervention, the typical pattern of pricing in the commercial jour-
nal market is that subscribers pay high fees to access a journal’s content, while authors pay
little or nothing to publish, i.e., to access the journal’s subscribers.14 What is the asym-
metry between the two sides of the market which induces this skewed pricing, whereby
authors are offered a “bargain” funded from “ripoff” charges levied on subscribers? The
crucial issue is that the peer-review process ensures an article is only published in a single
journal and is differentiated from other published articles, and so readers need to subscribe
to several journals if they wish to see a wide range of content. (In the jargon of two-sided
markets, the asymmetric is that authors “single-home” while readers “multi-home”.) Each
published article thus constitutes a mini-monopoly, and a journal enjoys market power in
13Much material in this section has been taken from Armstrong (2015, section 2). In particular, the
numerical examples which follow are based on more fully-fledged and general models elaborated in the
earlier paper.
14As already noted, many non-profit journals have modest subscription fees. See Bergstrom (2001) for
an early discussion of the significant price differences between commercial and non profit journals in the
economics discipline.
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providing access for readers to its articles. For this reason, a journal in the absence of
regulation is able to set high subscription charges which need bear little relation to the
cost of running the journal. Even a tiny publisher with a single journal could set a high
subscription charge for access to its content.15
Because each article generates its own quantum of monopoly profit, a journal has
strong incentives to attract articles to publish and so will wish to offer a generous deal
to a suitably qualified author. An important and curious feature of the academic journal
market, dating from its inception, is that publishers do not usually pay authors for their
work. (Of course, an author may obtain financial reward for publications in prestigious
journals, via job promotion and so on, but those rewards are financed from elsewhere. For
some reason, academic books are different from journals and book authors are usually paid
advances and royalties.) As a result, the most generous deal a publisher can offer is that
an author can publish for free. Since authors are not paid, the often large revenues from
selling subscriptions to institutions are not easily dissipated and publishers can enjoy super-
normal profits. From this perspective, high subscription fees and excess publisher profits
are due mostly to the monopoly nature of each individual article, alongside a constraint
that monopoly subscription profits are not fully passed back to authors.16
This pattern of skewed pricing, with its “bargains and ripoffs”, would be reversed in
an alternative world in which readers each subscribed to a single journal, and authors had
to place their work in multiple journals in order to reach a large readership. (This is akin
to the old market for print newspapers, in which most people read a single newspaper
and advertisers had to place their advert in multiple outlets to reach a desired number of
eyeballs.) In such a world, it would be readers who would be courted by journals, and
authors would pay high fees for access to a journal’s captive subscribers.
The journal market is an instance of what I have elsewhere termed a “competitive
15However, having a portfolio of many journals may help a publisher obtain yet higher profits, due to its
ability to engage in price discrimination in the form of bundling its journal collection, as with the so-called
“big deal” contracts publishers negotiate with universities.
16Some authors particularly value their work being seen widely, and would be attracted to a journal
which has a low subscription price. Shavell (2010) studies a model where authors differ in the value they
place on readership, and in an unregulated market journals differ in the mix of author fees and subscription
fees they charge. (In his model authors can be paid by journals, and in equilibrium some authors choose
to be paid in return for disseminating to a smaller audience.)
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bottleneck”.17 In such a market, there are competing platforms which intermediate the
interaction between two sides. For perhaps exogenous or institutional reasons, one side
joins one platform exclusively (the single-homing side). The chosen platform can exploit
the monopoly position it holds on this single-homing side by setting high prices to the
other, multi-homing, side. Sometimes monopoly prices on the latter side are fully passed
onto the single-homing side, in which case platforms are less likely to sustain excess profits.
However, sometimes there are constraints which prevent full pass-through, for instance that
the single-homing side cannot be paid, in which case the platforms may retain a portion of
the monopoly profit, even when there is stiff competition between similar platforms. Other
markets with competitive bottleneck features similar to scholarly publishing include credit
cards (which consumers can often use for free if they pay the balance in full each month,
while merchants pay high fees on each transaction), shopping malls (which consumers
can enter for free, while retailers pay high rents for access to these consumers), online
search engines (where people can search for free, but advertisers pay high prices to appear
prominently in their search results), and call termination on telephone networks (where
before the advent of regulation subscribers had a subsidized phone and their callers had to
pay high charges to call them).
This competitive bottleneck logic can be illustrated in the following simple example.
First, imagine (as John Lennon might say) a world without journals. Author A obtains a
benefit of $5 when reader R sees her article, while R gains benefit $15 from reading A’s
article. It costs A some small amount to deliver the article to R (say, the effort of posting
the article online, which is much lower than $5), and so she is willing to do this. The
joint surplus from this exchange, which involves no monetary exchange, is therefore about
$20. Now introduce a group of homogenous journals, which for simplicity incur negligible
costs for disseminating the article to R. Since by assumption only one journal is able to
publish A’s article, the journal which obtains the article will be able to sell it to R for
$15. If a payment to A is feasible, journals compete to offer the highest such payment,
and the monopoly profit of $15 from R is passed back to A. Thus, in this stylized model,
the introduction of the journal market induces no significant efficiency gains, but operates
to transfer surplus from readers to authors. However, if as is more realistic there is a
17See Armstrong (2002, section 3.1, and 2006, section 5).
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constraint that A cannot be paid, journals will offer A free publication, A will choose a
random journal, which will then sell the article to R for $15. In this case, the combined
surplus of A and R falls from about $20 to $5 (all of which is enjoyed by A), the difference
being siphoned off by journals.18
Provided there is sufficient competition between publishers in a given subject area
and quality tier, a “gold” open access regime, in which a regulated author must publish
her article in a journal which make the article freely available at the time of publication,
entirely overcomes this problem of monopoly pricing by journals.19 Journals would then
usually have to cover their running costs by charging regulated authors a fee to publish
their paper. Like more familiar “one-sided” markets, journals would then compete for
custom from authors in terms of publication fee, turnaround time, value-added (or not)
from the refereeing process, and so on, and there is a greater chance that only normal profits
would be observed. As Brown et al. (2003, page 2) put it: “Open access would eliminate
monopolies over essential published results, diminishing profit margins and creating a more
efficient market for scientific publishing”.
A gold regime has other attractions relative to alternative policies involving “near” open
access. It is surely of some benefit to the reader to see the journal article itself (rather
than the author’s own pre-print as in a “green” open access regime): the format may
be somewhat more attractive, pagination for detailed citation is stable, she automatically
knows the name of the journal which published the paper, and she knows she has the final,
peer-reviewed version. A subscription price which is precisely zero (rather than merely
18This highly stylized example has historical parallels in the story of how Robert Maxwell exploited this
“competitive bottleneck” aspect of publishing when he started numerous new journals for his Pergamon
Press (later sold and incorporated into Elsevier). He believed that “we don’t compete on sales, we compete
on authors”. He offered to publish the journals of scientific societies in return for a small fee to them.
The editor of the Journal of Neurochemistry said Maxwell took over the journal after he was wooed with
a lavish dinner and a cheque for a few thousand pounds. See Buranyi (2017) for these and many more
details. Buranyi writes: “If a serious new journal appeared, scientists would simply request that their
university library subscribe to that one as well. If Maxwell was creating three times as many journals
as his competition, he would make three times more money. [...] And since there was no way to swap
one journal for another, cheaper one, the result was, Maxwell continued, ‘a perpetual financing machine’.
Librarians were locked into a series of thousands of tiny monopolies. There were now more than a million
scientific articles published a year, and they had to buy all of them at whatever price the publishers
wanted.”
19However, if the publishing market is relatively concentrated–and as discussed in section 1, the five
largest publishers account for about half the market–there may be scope to raise author fees, not just
subscription fees, above the competitive level.
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cheap) will reduce some journal costs, such as the selling costs associated with negotiating
contracts with libraries. Relatedly, it is easier for regulators to ensure that authors are
complying with gold open access obligations, rather than having to decide what counts
as a “cheap enough” journal subscription or having to check that the author has indeed
posted her accepted version in an appropriate online location.
Nevertheless, the gold policy essentially reverses the extreme skewness of pricing, mov-
ing from a situation where authors have free access to subscribers to one where readers
have free access to articles. Thus the “paywall” is shifted from readers to authors. Is this
opposite extreme pattern of bargains and ripoffs likely to be the most efficient way for
journals to cover their costs? First, there are sound public finance reasons why readers
should contribute something to the cost of publishing. Taking a parochial perspective,
many readers of journal articles written by authors in a relatively small country will be
overseas, and it is not obvious that national taxes should be used to fund free access for
these readers.20 Many users of scientific research are in the industrial and corporate sector,
and it is unclear why such users should free ride on a subsidized author-pays regime.21
Having to pay to publish will deter some authors at the margin from publishing at all.
Of course, not publishing an article at all is even more harmful to potential readers than
having to pay a high price for access. It may be that regulated authors have publications
fees built into their grants, in which case this is not an issue. However, if open access reg-
ulation succeeds in making publication fees widespread in the market, then “unregulated”
authors will be impacted too. Even if many authors have access to funds which can be
used to cover a publication fee, there will often be an opportunity cost when paying to
publish a paper. Many scholars in the humanities and/or in poorer countries do not have
research funds which cover publication fees. Indeed, a major drawback to a widespread
move to an author-pays journal regime may be that scholars in poorer countries will not
be able to adequately publicize their work to their peers in richer countries.
20One option here might be to offer open access only to those readers in the geographical area which
funded the research, as suggested in 2017 by Elsevier in www.elsevier.com/connect/working-towards-a-
transition-to-open-access.
21House of Commons (2004, paragraph 175) reports that Elsevier obtains 20% of its journal revenue
from this sector, and quotes the Biochemical Society as saying “in the open-access world it would appear
that the only real winners are going to be corporate pharmaceutical companies who would no longer have
to pay to access information.”
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A “near” open access policy might require authors to publish in journals with a short
embargo period, in journals with low but not zero subscription charges, or require authors
to post the accepted version of their published work online (and to publish in a journal
which permits this). Such policies mitigate the problems of high subscription charges
and excluded readers. When a somewhat inferior substitute is freely available (say, when
content is released after a short embargo period or if authors post accepted versions online),
then libraries have a valuable outside option, and publishers are forced to charge less if
they wish to continue selling their subscriptions. Moreover, the wider public has free access
to the inferior variant of the published article, while before they may have been excluded
altogether. Nevertheless, if the inferior variant is not too close a substitute, publishers
may still be able to extract sufficient revenue from libraries willing to pay for the premium
published version to cover their costs, albeit with less to spare. Therefore, this “freemium”
policy can be consistent with authors continuing to publish without charge.
Note that even if a publisher permits an author to immediately post the accepted version
of her published paper online, the evidence is that–beyond a few subjects, including
economics, computer science and physics–many authors do not go to the trouble to do this,
which is not surprising if their article is anyway being distributed to their desired audience
by a journal. Thus the “green” route to open access requires a degree of compulsion on
regulated authors to disseminate the accepted version of their articles. A beneficial by-
product of “green” open access regulations may be to stimulate a working paper culture
within a wider set of subject areas than is the case at present. Such a culture often enables
speedier access to research compared to a system where readers must wait for the published
article to arrive, and may also enable comments from readers (rather than just from editors
and referees) to be fed into the article’s final draft.
This discussion so far has focussed on the dissemination role of journals. Journals
also add value to the raw content, for instance in terms of certifying quality, attractive
formatting, providing feedback from referees to authors, and generally in “polishing” papers
for publication. Some of this added value benefits readers. If a journal is not permitted to
charge readers (or more generally faces an inflexible price cap on its subscription charges),
as in the gold regime, it cannot appropriate the extra benefit it provides readers in the
form of higher prices, and so will have less incentive to spend resources on such activities.
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Thus, we expect that an open access journal will provide expert feedback from referees
and editors and go through multiple rounds of revision only to the extent this is valued by
its authors (including the indirect impact on boosting readership insofar as this is valued
by authors), and the direct benefit of such activity on readers is ignored in the journal’s
calculus.
If we focus more specifically on the certification service, there is a downside to authors
bearing the costs of processing papers, which is that some authors may be unwilling or
unable to pay for certification. More selective journals are likely to charge higher author
fees than less selective journals in a gold regime, since they follow a more rigorous and
costly peer-review process. (By contrast, in the traditional subscription model, the extra
costs of peer-review for a selective journal are covered by readers.) As such, at least some
authors with good papers may be less willing or able to publish in selective journals. The
result is that the quality signal in a journal’s name becomes less precise, which harms
readers and (good) authors.
This issue can be illustrated as follows.22 An author has a paper which might be good
or bad. Readers in aggregate are willing to pay $10,000 to read an article known to be
good, and willing to pay nothing for an article known to be bad. An author knows the
quality of her paper, while readers cannot directly observe quality without investing in the
costly effort of reading. It costs a journal $2,000 to determine via peer review whether a
paper is good or bad, but all other journal costs are zero. Journals come in two forms:
a “discriminating” journal peer reviews all submitted papers (at the cost of $2,000 per
paper) and publishes only good papers, while a “non-discriminating” journal will publish
anything and incurs no costs. Because of its reputation, say, readers know whether a
journal is discriminating or not. An author enjoys some intrinsic benefit from being seen
to publish a good paper (if she has one), and if she has a bad paper she will not submit to
a discriminating journal since she knows her paper will be rejected.
In an unregulated subscription-funded market, the outcome is that discriminating jour-
nals compete for good papers, a journal which attracts a good paper charges readers $10,000
22Jeon and Rochet (2010) study a related model, except there is just one journal in their framework.
Like the example in the text, article quality is binary and known to authors in advance. They find that a
subscription journal will never publish bad papers, while an open access journal will publish a proportion
of bad papers. Thus, in their model a move to open access also dilutes the certification role of the journal.
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to read the paper certified to be good, and since the certification cost of $2,000 is covered
by the subscription revenue, it allows an author to publish for free when she has a good
paper.23 Readers infer that a paper which appears in a non-discriminating journal is bad,
and won’t read it (even if it is free). By contrast, if the author must publish her article
with open access in a journal, a discriminating journal will charge her $2,000 to publish
if she has a good paper. If her intrinsic benefit from being seen to publish a good paper
is greater than her opportunity cost of funding the $2,000 publication fee, the outcome is
as before and good papers are all published in discriminating journals. However, if this
benefit is below her opportunity cost (for instance, if she has limited research or personal
funds), the author prefers to submit a good paper to a non-discriminating journal which
charges her nothing.24 In this case, a reader must consult a non-discriminating journal if
she wants to see the article. If an uncertified article is relatively likely to be good (and this
depends on the underlying fraction of good papers and the distribution of author benefits
of being seen to have a good paper), it is worthwhile for readers to take the gamble of
reading a paper in a non-discriminating journal, although they suffer the disutility of hav-
ing to read some bad papers alongside the good ones. If an uncertified article is unlikely
to be good, though, readers may have no incentive to read undiscriminating journals at
all, and so these good papers will go unnoticed. Likewise, authors of good articles, such as
those in poorer countries, may not gain the reputation they deserve if they are financially
constrained to publish their work in lower-ranked outlets.
In sum, the demand for journal certification by authors may fall when authors must
pay to publish. In a subscription-funded market, authors can usually submit and publish
for free, and so an author has an incentive to place her article in the most discriminating
journal willing to accept it. The result is that potential readers, as well as members of
tenure and promotions committees, obtain a relatively precise signal of article quality from
the journal in which a paper appears. In an author-pays regime, however, it becomes more
expensive to publish a paper in a discriminating journal since the peer-review costs are
23To implement this scheme, the journal could charge a submission fee of $2,000 which is refunded if the
paper is judged to be good.
24For instance, within the PLOS group of open access journals, the highly selective PLOS Biology
currently charges authors $4000 to publish, while the less selective PLOS ONE charges $1749. Some good
biology papers will be published in the latter outlet when authors are financially constrained (or don’t
care enough about the incremental impact on their reputation).
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higher. As a result, some authors with good papers may be constrained or choose to submit
to a less prestigious journal. For instance, authors with an already high reputation may
reach their audience without the need for expensive journal certification.25 Readers and
committees then have a less precise signal of quality than before, and good papers may be
lost amongst the mediocre.
As before, a near open access regime can overcome these dangers. If the regime is not
“too near” to open access, a discriminating journal will be able to cover its costs (including
its costs of peer review) out of its subscription income, and authors of good papers do not
need to pay to have their article certified. As such, the policy may be compatible with
authors continuing to publish in the most selective journal that will accept their paper,
and the certification role of journals is maintained.
3 Plan S
Until recently, policy debates around open access have focussed largely on which of the
“gold” or the “green” routes to open access is more appropriate, assuming regulation of
some form is needed. That is, whether the regulated author should be required to make the
published article open access, or whether she merely has to make the accepted version of
the article available in some accessible way. In particular, regulation was at the individual
article level: on what terms should a particular piece of research contained in an article be
made available to readers?
For instance, the UK’s periodic Research Excellence Framework (REF), which at the
time of writing is about to evaluate departments in UK universities, has an open access
policy such that for a journal publication to be submitted to the current review, the article
must either have appeared without embargo from the publisher itself (the gold route), or to
use the green route the author’s accepted version must be publicly available from a suitable
repository no longer than 12 months after publication (or 24 months for humanities and
social sciences). In essence, this makes most of the journal articles originating in the UK
25Even without explicit fees for publishing in prestigious journals, there are often other costs authors
incur to publish in these journals, including the need to go through many stages of revisions. As a result,
there is evidence, at least within the economics discipline, that established scholars are choosing to publish
less often in the top ranked journals. See Ellison (2011) for further discussion.
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open access in some form, albeit with a very lengthy delay in many subjects. Although
it is hard to get data at this point, I feel confident in predicting that a large majority of
economics articles submitted to the current REF will follow the green rather than the gold
route to comply with open access requirements.
Plan S is a different kind of regulation, which focusses less on the article than on the
journal in which it is published. An explicit aim of the policy, at least initially, was to
terminate subscription payments for journal content, and to move to a world in which
only open access journals exist. The origins of the plan seem murky, as do several aspects
of its implementation. The architect of Plan S, Robert-Jan Smits, the European Union’s
special envoy for open access, gave a conference presentation in July 2018 during which
he announced a new radical plan to accelerate open access, the details of which would
be clarified later in the year.26 In this presentation he said that the plan’s “S” stands
for “speed, solution, science”, and that he aimed to use the financial influence of research
funders to put pressure on journals to change their funding model from a reader-pays to
an author-pays regime.
These promised further details were published as a manifesto in September 2018 in
Schiltz (2018), and Plan S was launched with the support of eleven European national
funding bodies and the European Research Council (ERC) who would all follow its policies.
Although Plan S seemed to many in the university world to come “out of the blue”, Schiltz
(2018, p.4) states that “Plan S was initiated by [Robert-Jan Smits] and further developed
by the President of Science Europe [Marc Schiltz] and by a group of Heads of national
funding organizations. It also drew on substantial input from the Scientific Council of the
European Research Council.” The manifesto is written in a kind of pious and dogmatic
style: “Monetising the access to new and existing research results is profoundly at odds
with the ethos of science. There is no longer any justification for this state of affairs to
prevail and the subscription-based model of scientific publication, including its so-called
‘hybrid’ variants, should therefore be terminated. [...] no science should be locked
behind paywalls!” (Schiltz, 2018, p.1, with emphasis in the original).
The manifesto proposes one key principle and ten subsidiary principles. The key prin-
ciple states that “After 1 January 2020 scientific publications on the results from research
26The presentation can be viewed on YouTube by searching for “ESOF 2018”.
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funded by public grants provided by national and European research councils and funding
bodies, must be published in compliant Open Access Journals or on compliant Open Ac-
cess Platforms”.27 Thus, within sixteen months of this announcement, the plan envisaged
that all European grant-funded research would have to appear in open access journals.
Among the ten subsidiary principles, one suggests that for disciplines in which high
quality open access journals do not yet exist “the Funders will in a coordinated way provide
incentives to establish these and support them when appropriate”, another suggests that
“when Open Access publication fees are applied, their funding is standardized and capped
(across Europe)”, another states that funders will monitor and sanction non-compliance
by authors, while another explicitly states that “the ‘hybrid’ model of publishing is not
compliant”. (It was later clarified that “mirror” journals would be considered to be hybrid
journals, and so would not be compliant either.) Another principle suggests that open
access will also be required for scholarly books and monographs, although the timeline
needed to achieve this may be longer. It was not explained why it is harder to achieve
open access for books, although one factor may be that authors would be unwilling to give
up their royalties if their books had to be given away.
Clearly, unless very many subscription and hybrid journals “flip” to become open ac-
cess, these policies would greatly restrict where researchers can publish their work. The
manifesto (Schiltz, 2018, p.3) acknowledges that “researchers need to be given a maximum
of freedom to choose the proper venue for publishing their results”, but immediately goes
on to warn that “researchers must realise that they are doing a gross disservice to the
institution of science if they continue to report their outcomes in publications that will be
locked behind paywalls”.28 The manifesto also gives a strong steer away from the certifi-
cation role of journals, saying that researchers who commit this “gross disservice” might
prefer to publish in non-compliant journals due to a “misdirected reward system which
puts emphasis on the wrong indicators (e.g., journal impact factors). We therefore commit
to fundamentally revise the incentive and reward system of science.”
27The precise meaning of “open access platforms” is unclear, although www.coalition-s.org (which is
the umbrella group of funders who support Plan S) says that “open access platforms are publishing
platforms for the original publication of research outputs (such as Wellcome Open Research or Gates
Open Research).” It certainly does not include subject repositories such as RePEc.
28In Enserink (2018), Schiltz is quoted as saying “The greater good of a well-functioning science system
is more important than the right of individual researchers to decide where to submit their papers.”
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There are profound problems with Plan S as it was originally proposed in this manifesto,
both in terms of its aims and in terms of its feasibility. As argued in the previous section, it
is by no means clear that a monoculture of open access journals is the most efficient way for
authors to disseminate and certify their work. For example, an environment with widely
available working papers and inexpensive high-quality journals, as is arguably already the
case in economics and other disciplines, may work better than one where all journals are
funded exclusively by author fees. Author fees might discourage some authors at the
margin from publishing their work, which is even worse than science being “locked behind
paywalls”. Permitting green open access, whereby authors can post the accepted version of
their paper online, might stimulate a working paper culture in a broader range of subject
disciplines, which carries its own advantages.29
In addition, the certification role of journals may well be diminished when subscription
fees are prohibited. Indeed, as mentioned it is one of the subsidiary aims of Plan S to
lessen this certification role, with its disdain for impact factors and the like, despite the
efficiencies caused by certification (especially for more junior scholars of high calibre).
What the stated aim “to fundamentally revise the incentive and reward system of science”
might actually mean is clarified to some extent in the current set of Plan S principles,
where principle 10 states that “The Funders commit that when assessing research outputs
during funding decisions they will value the intrinsic merit of the work and not consider
the publication channel, its impact factor (or other journal metrics), or the publisher”.30
How in practice a committee member asked to evaluate a grant application outside her
own areas of expertise should grasp the “intrinsic merits” of the applicant’s work is not
explained. It is also hard to understand how this aim to diminish journal certification
sits with another of the Plan S principles, which is that “the Funders will ensure jointly
the establishment of robust criteria and requirements for the services that compliant high
quality Open Access journals [...] must provide”; what does this notion of “high quality”
mean?
29Enserink (2018) quotes the open access scholar Peter Suber as saying that Plan S’s downplaying of
green open access was an “elementary mistake”, and that by allowing researchers to make their work
freely available while publishing in a “conventional, venerable” journal, green OA helps young scientists
who need the cachet of publishing in top journals.
30See www.coalition-s.org/plan_s_principles for a description of the current ten principles.
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The aim to standardize and cap publication fees is hard to interpret. Would they
be standardized across disciplines, or only within the same subject area? (The latter
seems the only reasonable policy, given the extent to which peer review costs differ across
fields.) Would a more discriminating and selective journal be permitted to charge higher
publication fees than a less discriminating journal, given that its peer review costs will be
higher? If not, and if the cap is set below that of a highly discriminating journal, this may
force such journals to become less discriminating and hence weaken further the precision
of journal certification.
The share of world research funded by the initial supporters of Plan S is tiny.31 This
would not give major international journals a sufficient incentive to “flip” to an open access
model, with the result that researchers with grants from Plan S funders would have a very
restricted set of journals to consider for their work. In economics, for instance, none of the
top 5 journals had any prospect of becoming open access, and so economists with grants
from these funders would be unable to publish in the discipline’s prime outlets. This
would disadvantage the careers of good researchers who had grants from these sources,
and also deter many of the best researchers from applying for grants from these sources.
(Funders compete for good applicants, just as journals compete for good papers, and Plan
S promises an excellent opportunity for non-Plan S funders to attract good researchers by
offering them the freedom to publish where they wish.) Relatedly, it would be hard for
a Plan S funded researcher to collaborate with other researchers who may not wish to be
so constrained in where they could publish. The economics discipline is arguably already
“dominated” by American scholars, and the inability of many European economists to
publish in the best journals or to collaborate with American-based researchers would only
exacerbate this problem.
While the manifesto suggests that funders will somehow establish new high quality
open access journals in disciplines where these do not yet exist, it hard to see how that
could happen in reasonable time, if at all. Journal reputations are notoriously “sticky”,
and for reasons of coordination it is a difficult task to launch a new quality journal, and
31https://deltathink.com/news-views-potential-impact-of-plan-s/ estimated that 3.3% of global research
articles in 2017 was funded by these initial Plan S funders.
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not one for which funding bodies are well suited.32 It is not clear that the market needs
still more journals in any case.
Even if it were to be judged desirable, the main aim of Plan S to induce most journals
to become open access would only be feasible if large numbers of funders from around the
world signed up to its principles. In part, this becomes another issue of coordination: if a
funder anticipates that few others will join the Plan S initiative, and hence that few journals
will become open access, then that funder may be reluctant to join too, as doing so will
unduly restrict where its funded research can be published. Soon after its launch, Robert-
Jan Smits embarked on a campaign to enlist new funders to join the original eleven.33
However, at the time of writing there are just eighteen national funders which are part of
cOAlition S, i.e., which are aligned with the principles of Plan S.34 These include only three
from outside Europe (Jordan, South Africa and Zambia), and none from North America
or Asia. (Important charitable funders based in the US, such as the Gates Foundation
and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, are also current supporters of Plan S.) An
important original supporter, the ERC, withdrew from cOAlition S in 2020, writing that
the requirement not to publish in non-compliant hybrid journals is “detrimental, especially
for early career researchers, researchers working in countries with fewer alternative funding
opportunities, [...]”.35
Since the hoped-for bandwagon of support for Plan S did not occur, and if it was not to
lose backers in addition to the ERC, its policies needed to be adjusted and weakened if they
were to remain workable for its supporting funders. The date for the start of the policy
was moved back one year to January 2021. (Whether this means that all publications from
this date need to be compliant or merely that publications arising from grants awarded
after this date need to be compliant is unclear.) Reference to standardized and capped
author fees was removed. Publication in hybrid journals was permitted, provided that the
32Bergstrom (2001) discusses this problem of coordination. He suggested (twenty years ago) that one
promising way within the economics subject area to increase the share of low-cost, high-quality journals
would be for existing such journals and societies to expand their portfolio of associated journals, to leverage
their existing reputation. In the time since this suggestion, the American Economic Association and the
Econometric Society have added several new “second tier” journals to their list.
33See https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06936-7, which quotes Smits as saying “By the end




journal “commits” to a path to become open access by means of a so-called transformative
arrangement.36 For instance, many Elsevier journals have become “transformative jour-
nals”, as has Nature (albeit with a publication fee of 9,500 euros to gain open access for an
article). What the sanctions would be if a journal did not satisfy all of the transformative
requirements over time are unclear. So far as I understand, none of the top 5 economics
journals is currently a transformative journal. Finally, the “green” route to open access is
permitted, but with very tight restrictions: the accepted version of the article must be de-
posited in a repository without an embargo period and be published with an liberal re-use
license (such as “CC-BY”). Few publishers would agree to such terms, at least without
payment of an author fee (which would not be covered by the funder).37 In sum, although
the Plan S requirements have become weaker than those in the original manifesto, they
nevertheless impose significant restrictions on where a funded author can place her work,
especially for those authors who cannot fund on their own the likely expensive “green”
route to open access which is permitted under the policy.
In conclusion, while the broadest aims of Plan S–to open up access to published
research–are laudable, the plan itself had and has many deficiencies and could well be
counter-productive. It does not appear to have been based on broad consultation, and
several obvious drawbacks to the original manifesto were mitigated only after a good deal
of criticism from researchers themselves. The timetable seems rushed, even with the current
weaker policies. (Are all these transformative journals really going to be fully open access
by the end of 2024?) The policy seemed to try to do too many things–induce widespread
flipping to open access by journals, capping author fees, downplaying the certification
role of journals–in too short a time and with too little support for this combination of
36The details of what counts as a compliant journal change frequently, but currently the requirements
include that the share of open access content in the journal rises by 5 percentage points each year, and
the journal becomes fully open access when the share of open access content reaches 75% or by the end
of 2024 (whichever is sooner). See https://www.coalition-s.org/addendum-to-the-coalition-s-guidance-on-
the-implementation-of-plan-s/ for full details.
37So one way for a Plan S funder author to publish her paper in a non-compliant hybrid journal would be
to pay for open access from the journal, which comes with an open license, and then, somewhat redundantly,
deposit the article in a repository. However, the author would not have her publication fee covered by her
grant in this case. Another possibility is that if the fraction of a journal’s articles which come from Plan S
funded authors is small, that journal may be willing to selectively grant these authors the ability, without
charge, to deposit their accepted paper without embargo and with an approved re-use licence. This is
currently the policy at the Science family of journals (see www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00103-1).
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policies. Lack of funding for author fees for open access in (non-compliant) hybrid journals
perversely means that fewer gold open access articles might be published than would be
the case with a policy which paid for hybrid open access. Plan S required the same tough
regulations for all disciplines, while in many subject areas beyond the sciences the journal
market arguably works satisfactorily without the need for further intervention, with all
its attendant costs. At the current time the bold policy appears to have lost its initial
momentum, and to have become a European-centric policy followed by a number of the
region’s national research funders, which will probably harm the career prospects of many
researchers in those regions, and which has not transformed the publishing market into
one populated mostly with open access journals.
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